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Abstract
This paper studies optimal market making for large–tick assets in the presence of
latency. We formulate the problem using Markov Decision Processes. We provide
explicit characterizations of the order value and the structure of the value functions.
We use such characterizations to study when a market maker can earn a positive net
profit and investigate the effect of latency. Numerical experiments are conducted to
illustrate our results.
Keywords: Market making; Limit order book; Large–tick assets; Markov decision process;
Order value
1 Introduction
A market maker in a security market provides liquidity to other investors by quoting bids
and offers, hoping to make a profit from the bid-ask spread while avoiding accumulating
a large net position in the assets traded. Market makers play a crucial role in financial
markets, as the liquidity they offer allows investors to obtain immediate executions of their
orders, and this flexibility facilitates market efficiency and functioning. Traditionally in
equity markets, there are ‘official’ or designated market makers who have entered into
contractual agreements with exchanges and they are under certain affirmative obligations
to stand ready to supply liquidity. In recent decades, major financial markets have be-
came electronic, and a modern exchange is typically operated as an electronic limit order
book system under a price-time priority rule, where all the outstanding limit orders are
aggregated for market participants to view, see Parlour and Seppi (2008) for an overview.
As a result, any professional trader can adopt market making as a trading strategy, often
through computer-based electronic trading decisions and automated trade executions. This
work focuses on such ‘unofficial’ electronic market makers, who can enter and exit market
at will or set buy and sell prices at any level.
In this paper, we study optimal market making with latency taken into consideration.
There are many different definitions for the term latency in the literature. Following
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013); Cartea and Sanchez-Betancourt (2018), we define latency as
‘the time delay between an exchange sending market data to a trader, the trader processing
information and deciding to trade, and the exchange receiving the order from the trader’.
Latency has always been important for participants including market makers in electronic
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trading where markets trade at high speed, see e.g. AFM (2010); Gomber and Haferkorn
(2015); Moallemi and Sag˘lam (2013). Indeed, it is essential for market makers to be able
to respond rapidly to newly available price information and changing market conditions by
placing or canceling orders at low latency.
We consider the market making problem of an agent trading a large-tick asset. Fol-
lowing Eisler et al. (2012); Dayri and Rosenbaum (2015), a large-tick asset is defined as
an asset with the bid-ask spread almost always equal to its minimum value of one tick.
Large-tick assets are typically liquidly traded. Indeed, if the asset price is low, then the
tick size relative to the asset price is larger, and hence liquidity providers can earn a higher
revenue margin (Yao and Ye (2018)). Empirically, it has also been found that electronic
market makers take on a prominent role in liquidity provision for large-tick stocks, see e.g.
O’Hara et al. (2018).
We formulate a discrete-time trading model to investigate optimal market making in
the presence of latency. We consider an ‘unofficial’ market maker trading on a single venue
and we model the asset price using a Compound Poisson process. Similar as in Moallemi
and Sag˘lam (2013); Stoikov and Waeber (2016), we assume a constant (absolute) latency
∆τ ≥ 0. The maker can quote a bid order for one unit and an ask order for one unit at any
discrete prices periodically with a deterministic period length ∆t > ∆τ , with the goal of
maximizing his expected profit within a finite horizon. At each period, the market maker
can choose to cancel the old orders that remain in the order book, replace them with new
orders at appropriate prices, or do nothing. At the end of the horizon, the market maker
liquidates his position and goes home flat. The optimization problem faced by the market
maker is formalized as a discrete-time finite-horizon Markov Decision Process (MDP). As
in the existing optimal market making studies (see, e.g., Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008);
Cartea et al. (2015)), we do not include rebate and fees for orders in the model for simplicity.
In addition, the market maker we consider is small in the sense that he does not impose
price impact onto the market and the decisions do not involve the size of orders.
To our knowledge, our model is the first to study optimal market making with latency.
By a delicate analysis of the MDP together with numerical experiments, we make the
following contributions.
First, we characterize and highlight the role of order value in optimal market making.
The value of an order measures the difference of its execution price with the fair value
of the asset at the time of order execution. It is referred to as the expected profit of an
order in the market microstructure literature, and has been widely used in equilibrium
models in finance and economics, see e.g., Sand˚as (2001); Hoffmann (2014). We show
that in our MDP model for optimal market making, the value of bid and ask orders from
the market maker in each period essentially plays the role of one-period reward, where
there is a terminal inventory penalty arising from liquidating inventory positions. We give
an explicit characterization of the value of an order under our model and provide simple
condition to decide when the order value is positive in the possible presence of latency. See
Theorems 1 and 2 .
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Second, we provide explicit criteria on when electronic market making is profitable
under our model. Based on the order value and the structure of the value function for the
MDP, we find that the profitability condition reduces to comparing two rates: (1) the rate
of the market maker’s limit order being ‘adversely’ filled when the market trades through
its limit price, e.g., due to a surge of flow of market order eats through the order book and
induces price jumps; and (2) the rate of small (or ‘uninformed’) market order flows that
hit the market maker’s limit orders at best quotes without moving the price. We show
that if the latter rate is smaller than or equal to the former, then the order values are
non-positive, and hence the market maker can not make any profit in trading regardless of
the number of quoting periods. On the other hand, if the latter rate is larger, then there
exists a bid-ask quote pair whose order values are positive. This allows us to construct an
explicit quoting policy so that when the number of quoting periods is sufficiently large, the
market maker can earn positive net profit. How many periods is needed depends on model
parameters including latency, and we can upper bound it explicitly using values and fill
probabilities of bid and ask orders. See Theorem 3.
Third, we provide qualitative insight on the importance of latency in optimal market
making. Our theoretical and numerical results show that latency can be an additional
source of risk for market makers. On one hand, the market maker can send new orders in
each period. Due to the possible price motion in the latency time window, such new orders
will enter undesirable price positions and bear the risk of being executed at an improper
price or not being executed at all. This can be reflected as in the decreased value of such
new orders. On the other hand, the market maker may have outstanding old orders in
the order book that have not been executed yet in each period. Under unfavorable market
conditions, the value of these outstanding orders is negative (i.e. earns negative expected
profit), and the loss the market maker suffers increases with latency. See Sections 4 and 5.
Related Literature. We explain the differences between our work and the existing
studies.
Our paper is related to the growing body of literature on optimal market making in
the quantitative finance literature, see, e.g., Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008); Gue´ant et al.
(2013); Guilbaud and Pham (2013); Cartea and Jaimungal (2015); Cartea et al. (2015);
Fodra and Pham (2015); Aı¨t-Sahalia and Sag˘lam (2017) and the references therein. These
papers mainly use continuous-time stochastic control approaches to determine optimal
quoting strategies for market makers in an expected utility framework. Among them,
Fodra and Pham (2015) and Chapter 10.2.2 in Cartea et al. (2015) consider large-tick
liquid stocks. Both studies focus on a single market maker who submits limit orders only
at best bid and best ask prices, so the control is a pair of predictable processes valued
in {0, 1}, indicating whether the market maker posts an order or not at the best quotes.
Cartea et al. (2015) models the asset price as a Brownian motion, and the executions of
orders are independent from the price. Fodra and Pham (2015) considers a rich model
where asset price is modeled by a Markov renewal process, and the market order flows
hitting the market maker’s quotes is modeled by a Cox process subordinated to asset
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price. Our model is similar (albeit simpler) in spirit to the one in Fodra and Pham (2015).
Our work complements these studies and differs from them in two main aspects: first, we
explicitly consider latency in optimal market making; second, to focus on the latency effect,
we consider simpler price dynamics using a Compound poisson process, but we allow the
market maker to submit orders at any discrete prices, including using market orders.
Our work is also related to the study of latency in algorithm and high frequency trading.
Moallemi and Sag˘lam (2013) quantified the cost of latency in an optimal execution problem
of a representative investor using the volatility and the bid-ask spread of an asset. Stoikov
and Waeber (2016) studied a pure market order strategy for optimal liquidation by taking
latency into account. Lehalle and Mounjid (2017) studied an optimal control problem
of letting a single limit order rest at the best bid price or cancelling it in the presence
of latency. Cartea and Sanchez-Betancourt (2018) considered the effect of latency for
liquidity-taking orders and studied how to balance the costs of walking the order book and
targeting a desired percentage of filled orders. Hoffmann (2014) found that low latency
allows liquidity providers to reduce their adverse selection costs by revising stale quotes
before picked off. See also Hasbrouck and Saar (2013); Kirilenko and Lamacie (2015);
Menkveld (2016); Baron et al. (2018) and the references therein for further related studies.
Our work differs from these studies primarily in that the problem we consider is optimal
market making in the presence of latency.
Finally, our paper is related to studies on the profitability of market making, see, e.g.
Chakraborty and Kearn (2011) and Chapter 17 of Bouchaud et al. (2018). Chakraborty
and Kearn (2011) related the profitability with time series models for the price dynamics
and they showed that market making is generally profitable if the price series exhibit mean
reversion. Bouchaud et al. (2018) analyzed whether a market maker who always quotes
at best bid and best ask prices can be profitable, using a model-free analysis. They found
that such simple market making strategies yield negative profits, and the main challenge
for large-tick stocks is to gain time priority in the queue. Our work is different from these
studies in that we study the profitability of optimal market making strategies using a
stylized MDP model with price modeled as a Compound Poisson process. In particular,
the net profit of the market maker in our model is lower bounded by zero as not sending
any quotes is also a feasible strategy.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the model and formulate the market maker’s optimization problem. In Section 3 we define
the value of an order. In Section 4, we present the main theoretical results. In Section 5,
we present numerical results for a representative large-tick stock using order book data
from NASDAQ. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Some technical details of the model and all
the proofs of the theoretical results are given in the Appendix.
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2 The MDP model for market making
In this section, we present a finite-horizon MDP (Markov Decision Processes) to model
an electronic market maker who aims to maximize his expected terminal wealth within all
admissible policies.
2.1 Market making in the presence of latency
To discuss the process of market making in the presence of latency, we first describe market
primitives. We assume that the bid-ask spread of the asset is exogenously given at constant
one tick, which is typical for large-tick liquid assets Dayri and Rosenbaum (2015). We also
assume that the best bid price {p(t) : t ≥ 0} is a compound Poisson process:
p(t) = p(0) +
N (t)∑
i=1
Xi, (2.1)
where {N (t) : t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with a rate λ and (Xi)i=1,2,... are independent
and identically distributed random variables taking values +1 (tick) and −1 both with
probability 0.5. See, e.g., Aı¨t-Sahalia and Sag˘lam (2017); Guo et al. (2017) for similar
models. We use symmetric jump size Xi as market makers typically have no directional
opinion on the assets they trade.
Next, we describe the market maker’s periodic quoting process in the presence of la-
tency. See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration. During a finite horizon [0, T ], the market
maker takes actions N + 1 times every ∆t time units. The market maker experiences a
constant absolute latency ∆τ ∈ [0,∆t).3 This latency captures the time delay between an
exchange sending message to the maker, the maker processing information and deciding to
trade, and the exchange receiving the actions or orders from the maker.
Specifically, starting from time zero, the exchange sends messages continuously to the
market maker. The messages contain the asset price, the trader’s outstanding orders (if
any), as well as other market information such as the order book. Outstanding orders refer
to limit orders (sent by the trader) waiting to be filled in the limit order book. The maker
takes actions N + 1 times in equal time intervals. In each period, except for the last one,
the market maker can take three kinds of actions for both ask and bide sides. Taking the
ask side as an example, the first one is that the maker sends an ask cancellation instruction
and a new ask order. The size of the order is fixed at one unit (e.g., 100 shares). The
cancellation instruction will automatically cancel the maker’s any outstanding ask orders
(if any). The second one is that the maker sends an ask cancellation instruction and does
not send any ask orders. The third one is that the maker does not send any ask orders or
3Technically, if ∆τ > ∆t, say, ∆τ = k · ∆t for an integer k ≥ 2, then one needs to consider Markov
Decision Processes with delays Katsikopoulos and Engelbrecht (2003), which is outside of the scope of this
paper.
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Figure 1: An illustration for the trader’s market making process
order cancellation instructions, i.e., doing nothing. It is similar for the bid side. With these
actions, it is readily seen that in our model the market maker has at most one ask/bid
outstanding order in the order book at any time. For the last period, the maker unwinds
all his inventory using a market order.
We define the N + 1 action times (including the last period) as the time when the
message is sent by the exchange on which the corresponding actions are made, i.e.,
ti := i ·∆t, for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N. (2.2)
Due to latency, the time when the orders or cancellation instructions of i-th action (if the
action is not doing nothing) enter into the limit order book is ti.5 := ti + ∆τ. In particular,
the time when the unwinding market order arrives at the exchange is
tN.5 := N ·∆t+ ∆τ.
For simplicity, throughout the paper, we say an order/instruction is sent at time t to mean
that the order/instruction sent is based on the information at time t. We assume that the
maker quotes as many times as possible. As tN.5 ≤ T , we have N = bT−∆τ∆t c, where bxc is
the greatest integer that is less than or equal to x ∈ R.
As standard in the literature (see e.g., Gue´ant et al. (2013); Cartea et al. (2015)), to
control the inventory risk, we assume the market maker’s inventory (number of units of an
asset held) is constrained by a lower bound q and an upper bound q. Here q and q are two
fixed integers with q < −1 and q > 1.
2.2 Order executions
We now describe the executions of the market maker’s (limit) orders in our model. For
illustrations, we consider an ask order attached with an arbitrary limit price. Considering
a bid order is similar. Note that for large-tick assets which typically have long queues of
limit orders at best quotes, most market orders do not walk the order book and limit orders
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are typically executed at best bid and best ask prices. In our setting, when the market
maker’s ask order arrives at the exchange, it can be executed in one of the following ways:
1. If the limit price of an ask order is smaller or equal to the market best bid price, the
order will get executed immediately.
2. Otherwise, the ask order will enter into the order book and it will get executed at its
limit price if
(a) either when the order sits at the best ask price and the best bid price jumps up
by one tick, crossing the limit price of the ask order;
(b) or the total time the order spends at the best ask price exceeds an exponential
random variable with rate λa.
Case 1 can occur, for example, when the maker sends a limit ask order and the mid-
price of the asset moves up during the latency period. The execution price of the ask order
is the market best bid price at the moment the ask order reaches the exchange.
In Case 2(a), the ask order is filled when the market trades through its limit price,
i.e., it is among the last in the queue to get filled just as the market moves higher. In our
model (asymmetric information is not explicitly modeled), this serves the role of ‘adverse
selection’ for market makers. Case 2(a) can happen, e.g., if there is a surge of buy orders
into the best ask.
In Case 2(b), the mid-price does not move when the ask order is filled, i.e., the order
leans against the queue behind it. We interpret λa as the hit rate of small or ‘uninformed’
buy market order flow that matches with this market maker’s ask order at the best ask.
Similarly, we use λb for the hit rate of small or ‘uninformed’ sell market order flow that
matches with this market maker’s buy order at the best bid price. These ‘uninformed’ buy
and sell market order arrivals are assumed to be mutually independent and independent
of the price process.
We remark that the rates λa and λb may depend on the rate of price change λ and the
latency ∆τ the market maker experiences. This would not affect our mathematical results
in Section 4. We suppress such dependence for notational simplicity.
2.3 State space and admissible action space
We now describe the system state and the admissible action space for the MDP model. We
write the state of available information at t as s(t), and the set of extended integers: Z :=
Z∪{±∞}. At any time t ∈ [0, T ], the market maker uses s(t) := (w(t), p(t), q(t), a(t), b(t)) ∈
Z3 × Z2 for making decisions, where w(t) is the market maker’s wealth, p(t) is the best
bid price of the asset, q(t) is the maker’s inventory. In addition, (a(t), b(t)) represents the
ask-bid outstanding quote pair. More precisely, p(t) + a(t) is the price of the marker’s ask
outstanding order at time t with a(t) = ∞ meaning there is no ask outstanding order at
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time t. Similarly, p(t) + b(t) is the price of the marker’s outstanding bid order at time t
where b(t) = −∞ means there is no bid order at time t. For the tractability of the MDP
model, we do not include the order book status, price signals, and other market information
in s(t).
From the Poisson assumptions, it is easy to see that the sample paths of s(t) are right-
continuous with left limits. For i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N , denote
si = (wi, pi, qi, ai, bi) := s(ti−), and si.5 = (wi.5, pi.5, qi.5, ai.5, bi.5) := s(ti.5−). (2.3)
The N + 1 states si, i = 0, 1, ..., N relate to the maker’s N + 1 actions (quote, cancellation
or unwinding) and sN.5 is the final state that is just before the time to end market making.
These N + 2 states s0, s1, ..., sN , sN.5 are the system states for the discrete-time MDP and
si.5, i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, are intermediates to compute dynamics of these system states.4 We
also call the N + 1 times ti, i = 0, 1, .., N , the decision epochs in the discrete-time MDP
(though at tN , the market maker simply liquidates the position using a market order).
We can now write down the state space. Clearly we have a(t) ≥ 1 and b(t) ≤ 0.
Note that when the maker’s inventory reaches the lower/upper bound, he should not have
any ask/bid outstanding orders at each decision epoch, since otherwise the inventory may
exceed the two bounds due to possible execution of those outstanding orders. Hence, the
state space S is given as follows.
S := {(w, p, q, a, b) : (w, p, q) ∈ Z3, (a, b) ∈ Z× Z, q ≤ q ≤ q, a ≥ 1, b ≤ 0,
if q = q, then a =∞, and if q = q, then b = −∞}.
Next, we describe the admissible action space. The maker is allowed to send market
orders, limit orders or not send any orders. For each period, when the market maker
receives the system state s = (w, p, q, a, b),we use a pair (δa, δb) representing the action of
the maker, where δa, δb ∈ Z ∪ {o}. δa ∈ Z means the maker quotes an ask order at price
p + δa, i.e., δa is the relative price comparing with the best bid price, together with an
instruction to cancel his previous ask outstanding order. δa =∞ means the maker cancels
his ask outstanding order but does not send any new ask orders. δa = −∞ means the
maker sends a sell market order with an ask cancellation instruction. δa = o means the
maker does nothing for the ask side. The difference between δa =∞ and δa = o is whether
or not the maker sends a cancellation instruction for the ask outstanding order.
It is similar for the bid side. δb = −∞ means no buy order but a bid cancellation
instruction is sent and δb = +∞ means a buy market order with bid cancellation. For
convenience, we also call δa, δb = ±∞ relative price and use the notation Zo := Z∪{o} for
the set of possible decisions.
We use As to denote the set of admissible actions (δ
a, δb) for state s, such that the
inventory of the market maker always stays in the interval [q, q] at any time. For the
detailed mathematical expression of As, see Section A.2.
4We use the left limits of the underlying continuous-time state process for the discrete-time state, which
is a convention in the continuous-time stochastic control literature.
8
To set up the MDP, we still need to describe the dynamics for the system state. We
refer the readers to Section A.3 for details.
2.4 Optimization problem for the market maker
In this section, we formulate the optimization problem for the market maker. The maker
quotes bid and ask orders at each period, and aims to maximize his expected terminal
wealth after he unwinds the position at the end of the trading horizon. Costs of trading
such as IT and compliance are not considered.
We first give the expression for the market maker’s terminal wealth, denoted as TW .
Suppose just before tN.5, the state sN.5 = s(tN.5−) is (wN.5, pN.5, qN.5, aN.5, bN.5). Then it
is easy to see that
TW := wN.5 + pN.5 · qN.5 + qN.5 · 1qN.5<0 = wN.5 + (pN.5 + 0.5)qN.5 − 0.5 |qN.5| . (2.4)
That is, if the market maker has positive inventory qN.5 > 0, then the maker unwinds the
position by sending a market sell order and the execution price is the best bid price pN.5.
Similarly, if qN.5 < 0, then the market maker sends a market buy order which will be filled
at the best ask price pN.5 + 1. We do not consider the price impact of such a clean-up
trade. This is reasonable as long as the market maker’s inventory bounds do not exceed
the market depth of best quotes in the order book. For large-tick assets, it is typical that
there are large volumes of limit orders sitting at best quotes.
Now we can formulate the optimization problem of the market maker as follows:
v0(s) = v0(w, p, q, a, b) := sup
pi
Epi[TW | s0 = (w, p, q, a, b)], (2.5)
where the supremum is taken over all Markovian admissible policies. Specifically, we have
each Markov policy pi = (f0, f1, ..., fN ), where fi(·) is a mapping from S to Z ∪ {o} × Z ∪
{o} such that for all s ∈ S, fi(s) ∈ As, the admissible action space. This function v0
is called the value function starting from the 0-th period. We can also define the value
function starting from i-th period, i = 1, 2, ..., N,N.5, as follows:
vi(w, p, q, a, b) := sup
pi
Epi[TW | si = (w, p, q, a, b)], i = 1, 2, ..., N,
vN.5(w, p, q, a, b) := w + pq + q1q<0 = w + (p+ 0.5)q − 0.5 |q| .
(2.6)
Mathematically, in Equations (2.5) and (2.6), the existence of expectations is not trivial
since the TW is not bounded. To address this issue, there is a standard method using an
integrable bounding function to bound value functions. For our MDP, one can use the
bounding function C(|w| + |p| + 1) which can be verified to be integrable, where C is a
constant that is independent of the state s. For simplicity, we omit the proof and refer
readers to Buerle and Rieder (2011) for this method.
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2.5 The Bellman equation
As we have formulated the market making problem as MDP, standard arguments yield the
following Bellman equation for the value functions:
vi(s) =

w + (p+ 0.5)q − 0.5 |q| , i = N.5,
E[vN.5(sN.5) | sN = s], i = N,
sup
(δa,δb)∈As
E(δ
a,δb)[vi+1(sN+1) | si = s], i = 0, 1, ...N − 1,
(2.7)
where the superscript (δa, δb) for vi means that in the i-th action, the ask action is δ
a,
and the bid action is δb. One can readily prove using the theory of upper semi-continuous
MDP that the supremum operators in Equation (2.7) can be attained, which generates an
optimal policy for the MDP. As the argument is standard (see, e.g., Buerle and Rieder
(2011)), we omit the proof.
2.6 Model limitations
Before we present the main results, let us briefly discuss the main limitations of our model.
First, market makers in practice make decisions based on microstructure information such
as the state of the order book and the queue positions of their limit orders when trading
large-tick assets. We work with a stylized MDP model to include latency in market making,
and do not include these features for tractability purposes. Through our simplified model,
we can find that the key ingredient in market-making is the value (expected profit) of
an order. In practice, a market maker can use the microstructure signals and latency
information to predict the order value and combine with our results to decide whether it
is profitable to trade a particular large–tick asset. In addition, in our model, the market
maker is risk neutral in the sense that he maximizes the expected terminal wealth. If the
market maker’s expected profit is risk-adjusted, then the profitability condition we provide
in this paper becomes a necessary condition for such a market maker to earn a positive
risk-adjusted profit. Finally, we do not directly model the competition of market makers
in this work. There can be other marker makers with similar strategies and information as
well in addition to the agent we consider, and lower latency can allow one to obtain a better
position in order book queues. Our model captures the relative speed advantage of the
agent in a parsimonious manner by directly specifying the rate at which the ‘uninformed’
market order flows hit the market maker’s limit orders, and this rate may decrease with
the latency that the agent experiences (with other things fixed).
3 Value of an order
In this section, we introduce and define the value of an order (also called ‘order value’)
that plays a critical role in our analysis of the optimal market making problem.
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The value (or the expected profit) of an order measures the difference of its execution
price with the ‘fundamental value’ of the asset at the time of order execution. For example,
if one uses the asset mid-price at the time of order execution as the fundamental value,
then the value of an one-unit market order is −0.5 ticks for a large-tick asset. That is, a
trader pays half of the bid-ask spread using a market order.
To define the value of a general limit order when there is latency, we note that the
market price might have moved between the moment an order sent by the market maker
and the confirmed placement of an order. With this observation, we now first define the
value of an ask order. Suppose based on the information at time zero, the ask order quoted
at the price p(0)+x with relative price x ∈ Z is sent to the exchange. This order experiences
a time delay t′1 ≥ 0 (this is the latency for the new order sent by the market maker) before
its placement is confirmed by the exchange. We then compare the execution price of this
order with the mid-price at time t′1 + t′2 (for some time t′2 ≥ 0) which is regarded as the
fundamental value of the asset. If the order is not executed by the time t′1 + t′2, then the
value of this order is zero. As we will see later, in our model, t′1 can be zero or ∆τ and
t′1 + t′2 can be ∆τ or ∆t depending on the order that we consider (e.g. an outstanding old
order or a new order sent by the maker) and when the order is canceled.
Mathematically, for any t′1, t′2 ≥ 0, we can define the value of an ask order with relative
price x as follows:
Hask(t′1, t
′
2, x) := E[(max{x−∆p[0, t′1], 0} − 0.5−∆p[t′1, t′1 + t′2]) · 1askt′1,t′2,x ]. (3.1)
Here, ∆p[t′, t′′] := p(t′′) − p(t′) indicates the change of the best bid price over the time
interval [t′, t′′], and the indicator function 1askt′1,t′2,x
specifies whether the ask order (which
enters into the order book or executed at time t′1) is filled before time t′1+t′2. See Section A.4
for its mathematical expression. We briefly explain (3.1). The execution price of this ask
order is its limit price p(0) + x, or the market best bid price at the time t′1, depending on
whether the market best bid becomes higher than the limit price of the ask order when
the ask order reaches the exchange. In addition, the mid-price at time t′1 + t′2 is given by
p(0)+∆p[0, t′1]+∆p[t′1, t′1+t′2]+0.5 as the mid-price is half tick higher than the market best
bid price. The above definition of Hask(t′1, t′2, x) also applies for x = ±∞. For x =∞, we
have 1askt′1,t′2,∞
≡ 0, because there is no ask order. Hence, Hask(t′1, t′2,∞) ≡ 0. Similarly,
x = −∞ means a sell market order and we have 1askt′1,t′2,−∞ ≡ 1. Thus, H
ask(t′1, t′2,−∞) ≡
−0.5, noting that E[∆p[t′1, t′1 + t′2]] ≡ 0 since the best bid price is a martingale.
The value of a buy order can be defined similarly. Suppose the buy limit order is quoted
with price p(0) + y. Then for any t′1, t′2 ≥ 0 and y ∈ Z, define the value of such a bid order
sent with relative price y with delay t′1 and comparison time t′1 + t′2 as:
Hbid(t′1, t
′
2, y) := E[(0.5 + ∆p[t
′
1, t
′
1 + t
′
2]−min{y −∆p[0, t′1], 1}) · 1bidt′1,t′2,y ], (3.2)
where 1bidt′1,t′2,y
specifies whether the bid order is filled before time t′1 + t′2. These functions
will be used in understanding the MDP and the value functions for market making.
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4 Main results
In this section, we present the main results. The first result is on the value of an order
and it is given in Section 4.1. The second result characterizes the structure of the value
functions of the MDP model and it is provided in Section 4.2. Finally, the third result is
on when the market making strategy is profitable and it is given in Section 4.3.
4.1 Characterization of the value of an order
We now state the first main result of this paper. It gives an explicit expression of the value
of an order with delay t′1 = 0. It also connects the value of an order experiencing positive
delay with that of zero delay. Finally, it provides simple conditions to decide when the
order value is positive. Recall Hask in (3.1) and Hbid in (3.2).
Theorem 1. For any t′1 ≥ 0, t′2 > 0 and (δa, δb) ∈ Z
2
,
(a) we have
Hask(0, t′2, δ
a) =

(
λa
λa + λ/2
− 0.5
)
· E[1ask0,t′2,δa ], δ
a ≥ 1,
− 0.5, δa ≤ 0,
(4.1)
Hbid(0, t′2, δ
b) =

(
λb
λb + λ/2
− 0.5
)
· E[1bid
0,t′2,δb
], δb ≤ 0,
− 0.5, δb ≥ 1.
(4.2)
(b) we have
Hask(t′1, t
′
2, δ
a) = E[Hask(0, t′2, δ
a −∆p[0, t′1])],
Hbid(t′1, t
′
2, δ
b) = E[Hbid(0, t′2, δ
b −∆p[0, t′1])].
(c) we have Hask(t′1, t′2, δa) ≤ 0 for any δa ∈ Z if and only if λa ≤ λ/2; similarly,
Hbid(t′1, t′2, δb) ≤ 0 for any δb ∈ Z holds if and only if λb ≤ λ/2.
Part (a) of this result states that the value of an order with zero delay is linear in
its fill probability. We briefly discuss the economic interpretations of the coefficients. For
illustrations, we take Hask(0, t′2, δa) as an example. For δa ≤ 0, the ask order is effectively a
market order, and will be filled instantly at the current best bid price as there is no latency.
So its execution price is 0.5 tick less than the mid-price at the time of execution. As the
best bid price and the mid-price is a martingale with independent increments, it follows
that the expected profit or the value of such an order is −0.5 ticks. On the other hand,
for δa ≥ 1, the limit sell order enters into the order book, and by (4.1) its value equals
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to a constant λ
a
λa+λ/2 − 0.5 multiplied by the fill probability of the ask order E[1ask0,t′2,δa ]
on [0, t′2]. This constant
λa
λa+λ/2 − 0.5 represents the conditional expected profit of the ask
order given that the order is filled. To see this, we note that when such an ask order is
filled, there are two scenarios: first, the ask order sits at the best ask price, and eventually
transacts with an ‘uninformed’ buy order, gaining 0.5 tick as the mid-price does not move
at the time of execution (‘spread capture’); second, the best bid price of the asset jumps up
and crosses the quoted price of the ask order, in which case, the ask order loses 0.5 tick as
the mid-price immediately moves up one tick at the time of execution of the order (‘adverse
selection’). The rate of the first scenario occurs is λa, while the rate of the second scenario
occurs is λ/2. Hence, the expected profit the limit sell order conditioned on execution is
given by
λa
λa + λ/2
· 0.5 + λ
λa + λ/2
· (−0.5) = λ
a
λa + λ/2
− 0.5.
While our model does not feature information asymmetry, the result here is consistent
with the existing studies (see e.g., Sand˚as (2001); Moallemi and Yuan (2017)) where they
showed that one can interpret the order value as follows:
Value of an order = (spread capture − adverse selection cost)× fill probability.
We next discuss Part (b). It suggests that the value of orders with latency t′1 is the
expected value of orders with zero latency where the quotes (δa, δb) are perturbed by
random fluctuations of the market price during the latency window. So if, for example,
quoting at the best ask price δa = 1 is optimal (in maximizing the order value) in the case
of zero delay t′1 = 0, then such a quote may be not optimal anymore in the case of a delay
t′1 > 0, and the order value will be decreased.
Part (c) says if λa ≤ λ/2, then there are no ask orders with positive values and if
λa > λ/2, there is at least one ask limit order whose value is positive. It is similar for
the bid side. This result will be useful in characterizing the profitability of market making
strategies discussed in Section 4.3. Note that for t′1 = 0, the result in Part (c) clearly
holds in view of Part (a). For general t′1 ≥ 0, one needs to combine Parts (a) and (b),
and properties of the random walk and Poisson processes to establish the result. See
Appendix B.1 for details of the proof.
4.2 Structure of value functions and the role of order value
We now present the second main result of the paper. It characterizes the structure of value
functions in (2.7) and highlights the role of value of orders in optimal market making.
To facilitate the presentation, let us use the indicator functions 1ask0 and 1bid0 to denote
whether the ask and bid outstanding orders (observed at time 0) are filled in [0,∆τ). We
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also define
Haskact (a, δ
a) :=
{
Hask(0,∆τ, a) +Hask(∆τ,∆t−∆τ, δa), δa ∈ Z,
Hask(0,∆t, a), δa = o,
(4.3)
and
Hbidact(b, δ
b) :=
{
Hbid(0,∆τ, b) +Hbid(∆τ,∆t−∆τ, δb), δb ∈ Z,
Hbid(0,∆t, b), δb = o.
(4.4)
Then we can obtain the following result. It shows that the value of the market maker’s
bid and ask orders in one period, that is Haskact (a, δ
a) +Hbidact(b, δ
b) as we will explain later,
essentially plays the role of one-period reward in our MDP model.
Theorem 2. For any s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S, we have vN.5(s) = w+ (p+ 0.5)q − 0.5|q| and
vi(s) = w + (p+ 0.5)q + gi(q, a, b), i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N, (4.5)
where
gi(q, a, b) :=

Hask(0,∆τ, a) +Hbid(0,∆τ, b)
− 0.5E[ |q − 1ask0 + 1bid0 |
∣∣(a0, b0) = (a, b)], i = N,
max
(δa,δb)∈As
Gi(q, a, b, δ
a, δb), i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1,
(4.6)
and
Gi(q, a, b, δ
a, δb) := E[gi+1(q1, a1, b1) | (q0, a0, b0) = (q, a, b), (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
+Haskact (a, δ
a) +Hbidact(b, δ
b).
(4.7)
Theorem 2 reduces the computation of value functions from five state-variables to three
state-variables (q, a, b) in the backward recursion (4.6). As suggested by (4.5), the value
function vi(w, p, q, a, b) can be decomposed into three parts: (1) w represents the market
maker’s current wealth or cash; (2) (p+ 0.5)q is the value of the inventory marked to the
market at the mid-price; (3) gi(q, a, b) represents the extra value from following the optimal
strategy, and this extra value depends on the market maker’s outstanding orders as well as
the inventory. In particular, there is an inventory penalty −0.5|q| at the terminal time tN.5
which arises as the market maker needs to unwind his positions by using a market order
and crossing the bid-ask spread.
The backward recursion and maximization problem in (4.6) and (4.7) specify the trade
off between the value of orders (outstanding orders and new orders sent in the action) in
the current period and the expected extra value gi+1 at the next period. Specifically, the
term Haskact (a, δ
a) + Hbidact(b, δ
b) in (4.7) is the value of outstanding orders and new orders
in the actions in the current period. To see this, note if δa, δb ∈ Z, then the lifetime of
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the outstanding orders in the current period is ∆τ ; otherwise (i.e. doing nothing) the
outstanding order stays in the order book for ∆t in one period. Similarly, the new orders
sent in the i-th action, if entered into the order book, stays for ∆t − ∆τ in the current
period. This explains (4.3), (4.4) and hence the interpretation for Haskact (a, δ
a)+Hbidact(b, δ
b).
We also explain the similarities and differences between the structure of the value
functions here and that in the existing literature on optimal market making with zero
latency (under different models). When there is zero latency, i.e. ∆τ = 0, one can readily
show that the value function does not depend on the prices of outstanding orders (a, b).
This is because when ∆τ = 0, if δa, δb ∈ Z, the outstanding orders at time ti− will be
canceled at time ti instantly and hence they are not filled; and mathematically δ
a, δb = o
is equivalent to δa = a, δb = b. In this case, the decomposition structure of value functions
in (4.5) is similar as in Cartea and Jaimungal (2015). Due to the presence of latency
in our model, we can observe two main differences between our result and those in the
literature (see e.g., Cartea and Jaimungal (2015)). First, our extra value gi depends on
the outstanding orders. Second, due to the existence of latency, these outstanding orders
may be executed before the market maker can cancel them, which will affect the future
inventory and actions of the market maker.
4.3 Profitability of market making strategies
We present the third main result of the paper. It allows us to better understand the
profitability of the market making strategies with ∆τ ≥ 0. To be specific, we consider the
net profit NP of the market maker, defined as
NP := v0(w, p, 0,∞,−∞)− w. (4.8)
That is, NP is the expected net wealth change over the horizon [0, T ], where the market
maker starts with cash w, zero inventory (q = 0) and no outstanding orders (a = ∞, b =
−∞) in the limit order book at time zero. Our result given below shows when NP is
positive.
Theorem 3. Fix latency ∆τ ≥ 0 and other parameters λ, λa, λb,∆t, q, q. We have
(1) If λa ≤ λ/2 and λb ≤ λ/2 , then NP = 0 for any N ≥ 1.
(2) If λa > λ/2 and λb > λ/2, then there exists a finite positive integer Nmin depending
on the fixed parameters such that
NP
{
= 0, for N < Nmin,
> 0, for N ≥ Nmin.
We next discuss the implications of Theorem 3.
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Part (1) of this result says that under the conditions that the rates of ‘uninformed’
market orders that transact with market maker’s limit orders λa, λb are smaller than λ/2,
then the market maker can not make a positive profit regardless of how many times the
market maker quotes. These conditions are likely to hold when either the market is highly
volatile with a large rate of price change λ or there are not sufficient ‘uninformed’ market
orders hitting the market maker’s limit orders which leads to low values of λa and λb. Part
(1) then suggests that in these scenarios, electronic market making on the single asset is
not profitable.
Part (2) of this result suggests that the market making strategy can be profitable if
the market conditions are good in the sense that λa, λb > λ/2, and the market maker
can quote a large number of times, or equivalently, have a long trading horizon when the
period length ∆t is fixed. Though we do not have an analytical expression for Nmin, this
quantity has an explicit computable upper bound which only involves the values and fill
probabilities of certain ask and bid orders. See the proof of Theorem 3 for details.
To understand the intuition behind Theorem 3, we use the characterization of the order
value in Theorem 1 and the value functions in Theorem 2. On the one hand, by Part (c)
of Theorem 1, there are no orders whose order values are positive when λa ≤ λ/2 and
λb ≤ λ/2. As Theorem 2 suggests that the order value essentially plays of the role of one-
period reward in the dynamic optimization problem, we can infer that the market maker
can not earn a positive profit. On the other hand, when λa, λb > λ/2, Part (c) of Theorem
1 shows that there exists an ask-bid quote pair whose order values are both positive. Then
we can use this quote pair to construct an explicit feasible market making policy, for which
the profit becomes positive for sufficiently large number of quoting times N .
Before we proceed to numerical experiments, we briefly comment on the cases λa >
λ/2 ≥ λb and λb > λ/2 ≥ λa. In both cases, there exist orders with positive order value
for one side while there are none for the other side. Depending on the values of λa, λb and
other model parameters, it is possible that NP = 0 for any N (as in Part (1) of Theorem 3)
or NP > 0 for sufficiently large N (as in Part (2) of Theorem 3).
5 Numerical experiments
In this section, we present numerical results. Section 5.1 discusses estimations of model
parameters using NASDAQ data. Section 5.2 discusses a representative example of the
optimal quoting policy of the market maker and the associated inventory process. Sec-
tion 5.3 illustrates our results on order value. Section 5.4 illustrates our main results on
profitability of market making and effect of latency numerically. Our numerical results
are based on solving the backward recursion in Theorem 2, where we can compute the
functions gi, and find the optimal quotes by truncations of the infinite state and action
spaces and using exhaustive search for the maximization problem in (4.6).
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5.1 Estimations
We discuss the estimations of model parameters λ, λa, λb in this section. Other parameters
such as the quote duration ∆t, the trading horizon T , the inventory bounds q, q, are all
chosen by the market maker.
5.1.1 Data description
We use NASDAQ’s TotalView-ITCH data, which contains message data of order events.5
The database documents all the order activities causing an update of the limit order book
up to the requested number of levels and thus includes visible orders’ submissions, cancel-
lations and executions with order reference numbers. Each visible limit order is identified
with a unique order reference number which is assigned immediately after the submission.
The timestamp of these events is measured in seconds with decimal precision of at least
milliseconds and up to nanoseconds depending on the requested number of levels.
We conduct the parameter estimation using one representative large-tick stock, General
Electric Company (GE), with data from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on a randomly selected
day: Oct 3, 2016. Table 1 shows the observations of the bid-ask spreads on that day. As
one can see, the spread of GE is 1 tick for the most of the time and the spread is rarely
larger than 2 ticks. We also report that the average sizes of limit order queues on best ask
and best bid are 8758 and 7727 shares respectively.
Table 1: Percentages of observations with different bid-ask spreads for GE on Oct 3, 2016.
Bid-ask spread 1 tick 2 ticks ≥ 3 ticks
Percentage 88.236 11.757 0.007
5.1.2 Estimations of model parameters
We first discuss how to estimate λ, the intensity of market price change in our model. As
we assume in the model that the bid-ask spread is always 1 tick, we first delete the data
when the bid-ask spread is more than 1 tick. Then, we can estimate the intensity of price
change using the average number of jumps of the mid-price per minute during the day.
This yields
λ = λGE = 1.56 per minute.
We then discuss how to estimate λa, λb, the rates of ‘uninformed’ market orders that
transacts with the market maker’s limit orders at best quotes. We count a market order
as an ‘uninformed’ market order if the mid-price does not change after the market order
arrives and generates trades, and then we estimate the intensity of arrivals of the total
5Data is provided by LOBSTER website (https://lobsterdata.com/).
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‘uninformed’ market orders by computing the average numbers of arrivals per minute. For
simplicity, we use half of the total intensity for buy and sell ‘uninformed’ market orders,
which leads to
λaGE = λ
b
GE = 1.25 per minute.
Note that λaGE and λ
b
GE correspond to the case in which a market maker’s orders are always
at the front of the queue at the best quotes. For a particular market maker, the rates λa
and λb could be less than λaGE as the orders he sent may not have the highest execution
priority in the queue. In addition, λa and λb may depend on other factors including the
latency and the speed advantage of a particular market maker compared with traders
performing similar strategies. For illustration purposes, in our numerical experiments, we
fix λa = λb = 0.7 · λaGE = 0.875 per minute > 0.5λGE unless otherwise specified. In
particular, we assume λa, λb are independent of the latency ∆τ in this section. We remark
that it is possible to estimate λa and λb and show their dependence on ∆τ for a particular
market maker based on our theoretical analysis in the paper. See Appendix C for details.
5.2 The market maker’s optimal quotes and inventory process
Based on the parameters estimated above, we show in Figure 2 a representative example
of the market maker’s optimal quotes and the inventory process in one simulation. In this
example, the market maker quotes every one second in an 100-minute window. The latency
is fixed at 0.02 seconds. In this sample path, the market maker sends 129 ask orders and 35
bid orders in total. Among all these orders, 13 ask orders and 13 bid orders are executed.
The left panel of Figure 2 records the optimal quote process. We use quote value 15 to
denote the action δa = o, i.e. do nothing on the ask side; Similarly, we use quote value -14
to denote δb = o. For any other value y ∈ (−14, 15) in the vertical axis, it represents the
market maker’s quote δa = y or δb = y. For this particular sample path, we observe that
the action of the maker is doing nothing for many periods. This is because sending new
orders have potential drawbacks due to latency: if the market price moves in the latency
window, then the new orders sent by the maker may enter into undesired price levels or get
‘adversely filled’ when arriving at the order book. So if the maker already has outstanding
orders at suitable prices, then it is possible that doing nothing is better than sending new
orders to replace the outstanding orders. We also observe that when the maker has nonzero
inventories, his quote pair may be asymmetric. For example, when time is 450 seconds,
the inventory is -2 (see the right panel of Figure 2) and the action is (δa, δb) = (5, 0). In
this case, the market maker is less willing to sell given that the inventory is negative.
5.3 Order Value and Latency
In this section, we use numerical experiments to illustrate our results in Sections 4.1 on
order value based on the parameters from Section 5.1.2.
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Figure 2: The market maker’s optimal quotes and the inventory process in one simulation.
The model parameters are: q = −4, q = 4,∆τ = 0.02 seconds, ∆t = 1 second, T = 600
seconds, λ = λGE and λ
a = λb = 0.7λaGE .
Figure 3 shows, using two representative examples with different latencies, the value of
new ask orders sent by the maker Hask(∆τ,∆t−∆τ, δa) (see (3.1) and (4.3)) as a function
of the quote decision δa. We only show the order value for δa from 1 to 5, because the
order value is almost zero for δa > 5 (as the order fill probability is very small) and the
order value is close to −0.5 for δa < 0 (as the ask order will be filled instantly with a high
probability when arriving at the order book).
We can make two observations from Figure 3. First, for both cases in Figure 3, there
exists δa such that the order value is positive. This is consistent with Part (c) of Theorem
1 as λa = λb > λ/2 in Figure 3. Second, the maximum order value is attained at δ
a = 1
for ∆τ = 0.2 seconds, which is 1.48 × 10−3, and at δa = 2 for ∆τ = 0.8 seconds, which is
4.58× 10−5. This is not surprising in view of Theorem 1. On the one hand, when ∆τ = 0,
by Part (a) of Theorem 1, the order value equals to a constant multiplied by the order fill
probability and hence it attains the maximum when δa = 1. Then intuitively one expects
this also holds for small ∆τ by continuity. On the other hand, when ∆τ becomes larger,
the probability that the ask order quoted at δa = 1 is filled instantly (‘adversely fill’) when
arriving at the order book increases, due to the possible price movement in the latency
window. Thus, order value at δa = 1 may become negative and hence the maximum value
may be attained at a larger δa.
Figure 4 shows, the value of ask outstanding orders Hask(0,∆τ, a) (see (3.1) and (4.3))
with a = 1, 2, as a function of latency ∆τ , in an unfavorable situation: λa = λb < 0.5λ.
Note that the order values are all negative which is consistent of part (a) of Theorem 1. The
fill probability of an outstanding order increases as latency increases, and hence by part
(a) of Theorem 1, the order value decreases. Note the value of outstanding orders plays
a important role in the value function (see (4.3)). Thus, this experiment shows another
disadvantage of latency for the market maker: if the maker cannot cancel his stale orders in
a timely fashion due to latency, then it will decrease his profit when the market condition
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Figure 3: Value of new ask orders sent by the maker Hask(∆τ,∆t−∆τ, δa) as a function
of δa for different latency ∆τ . The remaining model parameters are: ∆t = 4 seconds, and
λ = λGE , λ
a = λb = 0.7λaGE > 0.5λGE .
is unfavorable.
5.4 Net Profit of Market Making and Latency
In this section, we illustrate numerically our results in Section 4.3 on the profitability of
market making and effect of latency.
We show in Figure 5, using two representative examples with λa = λb = 0.7λaGE >
0.5λGE and λ
a = λb = 0.5λGE , the market maker’s net profit NP as a function of latency
∆τ . There are two immediate observations from Figure 5: First, we find that when λa =
λb = 0.5λGE , NP are always zero for any ∆τ . This is also consistent with Part (1) of
Theorem 3. Second, fixing other parameters, NP is a non-increasing function of ∆τ . In
particular, when the latency ∆τ is large, then NP becomes zero. This is because the
number of quotes N = 599 is fixed in this example, while numerically the threshold Nmin
for earning positive profit in Theorem 3 increases with ∆τ . So when the latency is large,
we have N < Nmin and the net profit of the market maker is zero by Part (2) of Theorem 3.
6 Concluding remarks and future research
In this paper, we propose a stylized discrete-time MDP model to study optimal market
making strategies for large–tick assets in the presence of latency. We provide explicit char-
acterizations of the order value, as well as the structure of the value functions. We use
such characterizations to study the profitability of market making strategies and the effect
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Figure 4: Value of ask outstanding orders Hask(0,∆τ, a) as a function of ∆τ (measured
in seconds) for different a. The remaining model parameters are: λ = λGE and λ
a = λb =
0.4λaGE < 0.5λGE .
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Figure 5: Net Profit of a market maker NP as a function of ∆τ for different λa (= λb).
The remaining model parameters are: q = −2, q = 2,∆t = 0.5 seconds, T = 90 seconds,
and λ = λGE .
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of latency. Our analysis suggests that latency can be an additional risk source for market
makers and one key task in market making is to predict the order values based on market
primitives, see, e.g., Moallemi and Yuan (2017) for an example of recent developments
along this line. For future research to extend our model in the current paper, a variety of
realistic features can be considered. For example, the latency a market maker experiences
in practice is random and may vary when market condition changes, e.g. due to a huge
increase in quotes and cancellation requests. In addition, high-frequency asset price typ-
ically demonstrates autocorrelations in real markets. We hope that our model stimulates
further research to address such practical issues.
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A Further details of the Model in Section 2
A.1 Preliminaries
We adopt the following conventions related to the operations for ±∞: (1) −∞ < x <∞ for
any x ∈ Z; (2)∞+x =∞ for any x ∈ Z∪{∞}; (3) −∞+x = −∞ for any x ∈ Z∪{−∞};
and (4) for any x ∈ Z ∪ {±∞},
±∞× x =

±∞, x > 0,
∓∞, x < 0,
0, x = 0.
A.2 The mathematical expression of the admissible action space
In this section we give the expression of the market maker’s admissible action space As
for state s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S. We discuss the zero latency case and positive latency case
separately, since the outstanding orders at time ti will get canceled instantly if latency
∆τ = 0.
If ∆τ = 0, the admissible action space for state s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S, denoted as A0s,
is given by
A0s :={(δa, δb) ∈ Zo × Zo :
if q = q, then δa ∈ {∞, o} or δb =∞;
if q = q, then δa = −∞ or δb ∈ {−∞, o}}.
(A1)
If the inventory reaches the lower bound, then the maker should not quote ask order (in
this case, there will not be any ask outstanding orders, and hence δa =∞ and δa = o are
effectively the same), or he should use a buy market order, otherwise his inventory may go
beyond the bound. It is similar for the case when q = q.
To write down the expression of As when latency ∆τ > 0, we first define two disjoint
subsets of the state space S as follows. Write
S := {(w, p, q, a, b) :(w, p, q) ∈ Z3, (a, b) ∈ Z× Z,
if q = q, then a =∞, b ≤ 0
if q = q + 1, then a <∞, b ≤ 0},
(A2)
and
S := {(w, p, q, a, b) :(w, p, q) ∈ Z3, (a, b) ∈ Z× Z,
if q = q, then a ≥ 1, b = −∞
if q = q − 1, then a ≥ 1, b > −∞}.
(A3)
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The set S contains the states in which the market maker’s inventory has either reached the
lower bound q or will reach the lower bound if the ask outstanding order gets filled and
the bid order does not get filled. In these cases, the market maker should not quote ask
orders or he should use a buy market order in order for the inventory to stay within the
bound. The set S can be interpreted similarly.
Hence, if latency ∆τ > 0, the admissible action space for state s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S,
denoted as A+s , is given by
A+s ={(δa, δb) ∈ Zo × Zo :
if s ∈ S, then δa ∈ {∞, o} or δb =∞;
if s ∈ S, then δa = −∞ or δb ∈ {−∞, o}}.
(A4)
To summarize, we can combine (A1) and (A4) to deduce that the admissible action
space for state s is given by
As =

{∞, o} × Zo ∪ Zo × {∞}, ∆τ = 0, q = q, or ∆τ > 0, s ∈ S,
{−∞} × Zo ∪ Zo × {−∞, o}, ∆τ = 0, q = q, or ∆τ > 0, s ∈ S,
Zo × Zo, otherwise.
(A5)
A.3 System dynamics for our MDP model
We now describe the dynamics of the discrete system states of the MDP, i.e., si, i =
0, 1, 2, ..., N,N.5. For i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, denote the i-th action/decision of the maker by
(δai , δ
b
i ). For period i = 0, 1, ..., N , we use two indicator functions 1aski and 1bidi to specify
whether the ask and bid outstanding orders (if any) at time ti− are filled (1 if filled; 0 if
not) before time ti.5 respectively. Note these outstanding orders will be canceled at time
ti.5 if the market maker sends cancellation instructions in the i-th action. Similarly, for
i = 0, 1, 2, ...N−1, we use two indicator functions 1aski.5 and 1bidi.5 to specify whether there
are any ask and bid orders of the maker filled in the time interval [ti.5, ti+1) respectively. If
the maker sends new orders and cancellation instructions at time ti−, then 1aski.5 and 1bidi.5
specify whether the orders sent at time ti− are filled in [ti.5, ti+1). Otherwise if the maker
does not send any new orders or cancellation instructions at ti−, i.e, δa, δb = o, then the two
indicator functions specify whether the outstanding orders (if any) are filled in [ti.5, ti+1). If
the maker sends cancellation instructions without new orders, i.e, δa =∞, δb = −∞, then
there will be no orders of the maker in [ti.5, ti+1) and 1aski.5 = 1bidi.5 = 0. See Section A.4
for the formulas of these indicator functions for order executions.
We now describe the dynamics of system states (w, p, q, a, b) from ti− to ti+1− for
i = 0, 1, .., N − 1. To begin with, we define the price changes ∆pi := p(ti.5) − p(ti) =
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N (ti.5)∑
j=N (ti)+1
Xj and ∆pi.5 := p(ti+1) − p(ti.5) =
N (ti+1)∑
j=N (ti.5)+1
Xj . Then we can readily obtain
that
wi+1 = wi + (pi + ai)1aski − (pi + bi)1bidi + paski.51aski.5 − pbidi.51bidi.5 , (A6)
pi+1 = pi + ∆pi + ∆pi.5, (A7)
qi+1 = qi − 1aski + 1bidi − 1aski.5 + 1bidi.5 , (A8)
ai+1 = (1− 1outaski+1) · ∞+ 1outaski+1rpoutaski+1 , (A9)
bi+1 = (1− 1outbidi+1) · (−∞) + 1outbidi+1rpoutbidi+1 . (A10)
where
paski.5 :=
{
max{pi + ∆pi, pi + δai }, δai ∈ Z,
pi + ai, δ
a
i = o,
pbidi.5 :=
{
min{pi + ∆pi + 1, pi + δbi }, δbi ∈ Z,
pi + bi, δ
b
i = o,
1outaski+1 :=
{
1− 1aski.5 , δa ∈ Z,
1− 1aski − 1aski.5 , δa = o,
1outbidi+1 :=
{
1− 1bidi.5 , δb ∈ Z,
1− 1bidi − 1bidi.5 , δb = o,
rpoutaski+1 :=
{
δai −∆pi −∆pi.5, δa ∈ Z,
ai −∆pi −∆pi.5, δa = o,
rpoutbidi+1 :=
{
δbi −∆pi −∆pi.5, δb ∈ Z,
bi −∆pi −∆pi.5, δb = o.
The usual conventions for ±∞ apply, see Section A.1. We briefly explain the dynamics
of wealth and outstanding orders as others are straightforward to see. In the wealth
dynamics, the market maker earns an amount equal to the execution price if an ask order
is filled, and pays an amount equal to the execution price if a bid order is filled. For the
i-th period, paski.5 is the price of the ask order of the maker that is filled in the time interval
[ti.5, ti+1) (if any). If δ
a ∈ Z, then the ask outstanding order will be canceled at time ti.5.
Thus, the ask order filled in [ti.5, ti+1) is the new order sent in the i-th action. Its execution
price is the larger of its own price pi + δ
a
i and the market best bid price at time ti.5, i.e.,
pi + ∆pi. Otherwise, if δ
a = o, then the outstanding order will not be canceled in the i-th
period and the execution price in [ti.5, ti+1) is the price of the ask outstanding order. It is
similar for the bid side.
For the outstanding orders, taking the ask side as an example, 1outaski+1 specifies
whether there exists an ask outstanding order at time ti+1− (1 if exists; 0 if not) and
rpoutaski+1 is its relative price comparing with the best bid price at time ti+1−. If δa ∈ Z,
then such outstanding order exists if and only if the new ask order sent at time ti− is not
filled in [ti.5, ti+1). Otherwise if δ
a = o, then the order exists if and only the outstanding
order for the i-the period (exists at time ti−) is not filled in [ti, ti+1). If δa ∈ Z, the relative
price is based on the price of the new order sent at time ti−; otherwise it is based on the
price of the outstanding order for the i-th period.
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We next describe the dynamics from tN− to tN.5−. The dynamics of the market maker’
wealth, market best bid price, the maker’s inventory, the maker’s ask and bid outstanding
orders are given as follows:
wN.5 = wN + (pN + aN )1askN − (pN + bN )1bidN , (A11)
pN.5 = pN + ∆pN , (A12)
qN.5 = q − 1askN + 1bidN , (A13)
aN.5 = 1askN · ∞+ (1− 1askN )(aN −∆pN ), (A14)
bN.5 = 1bidN · (−∞) + (1− 1bidN )(bN −∆pN ), (A15)
The main difference compared with the dynamics from ti to ti+1, i = 0, 1, .., N − 1 is due
to the fact that the market maker only unwinds his inventory position at time tN without
posting new quotes. To see (A14), note that if the ask outstanding order for the N -th
period is filled, then there will be no ask outstanding orders at time tN−. Otherwise, there
will be an ask outstanding order at price pN +aN − (pN + ∆pN ) = aN −∆pN . It is similar
for the bid side.
A.4 Formulas of the indicator functions for order executions
In this section, we give the formulas for the indicator functions specifying whether orders
are filled. By the assumption of the order execution for the market maker in Section 2.2,
we write two Poisson processes {N a(t) : t ≥ 0} and {N b(t) : t ≥ 0} with intensities λa
and λb. These two processes are mutually independent and independent with the price
process p(·). N a(·) can be interpreted as the efficient ‘uninformed’ buy market order flow
for the market maker, i.e., if an efficient ‘uninformed’ buy market order arrives at the order
book when a maker’s ask order stays at the best quote, then the ask order will be filled.
It is similar for N b(·). These two flows model (small) market orders sent by ‘uninformed’
traders such that they do not move price.
We first give a formula for a general definition specifying whether an order is filled. All
other indicator functions for order fills we use in this paper are special cases. We focus on
ask orders as it is similar for bid orders.
Suppose an ask order is sent at time t ≥ 0 and at relative price x ∈ Z. After a delay
t′1 ≥ 0, it arrives at the order book. We use the indicator function 1askt,t′1,t′2,x to specify
whether the ask order is filled before time t+t′1 +t′2, i.e., t′2 time units after it arrives at the
exchange. Assume that none of N (·),N a(·),N b(·) jumps at time t+ t′1 or t+ t′1 + t′2 (i.e.
ignore an event with probability zero). To determine whether the ask order is filled, we
need to know whether the maximum best bid price in the time interval [t+ t′1, t+ t′1 + t′2) is
larger than or equal to the ask order’s price p(t)+x, called by case 1 (this includes the case
that the ask order is filled instantly when it arrives at the order book), or the maximum
best bid price is one tick less than the ask order’s price and the ask order encounters an
29
‘uninformed’ buy market order, called by case 2. Thus, for any 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t′′, we define
∆pMt′,t′′ := max{p(t)− p(t′) | t′ ≤ t ≤ t′′} = max{
n∑
j=N (t′)+1
Xj | n = N (t′) + 1, ...,N (t′′)} ∪ {0},
which is the maximum price change in the time interval [t′1, t′2]. Recall that for any 0 ≤ t′ ≤
t′′, ∆p[t′, t′′] = p(t′′)−p(t′). Then, case 1 is equivalent to p(t+t′1)+∆pMt+t′1,t+t′1+t′2 ≥ p(t)+x,
i.e., ∆pMt+t′1,t+t′1+t′2
≥ x−∆p[t, t+t′1]. For case 2, for any 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t′′, we denote by MI[t′, t′′]
the random set of time, when the best bid price attains the maximum best bid price for
the time interval [t′, t′′] as follows:
MI[t′, t′′] := {t ∈ [t′, t′′] | p(t) = p(t′) + ∆pM [t′, t′′]}.
For any set of time I, denote by N a(I) the number of jumps of N a(·) in this time set I.
Then, case 2 occurs if the maximum bid price in the time interval [t+ t′1, t+ t′1 + t′2] is one
tick less than the ask order’s price, i.e., ∆pMt+t′1,t+t′1+t′2
= x−∆p[t, t+ t′1]− 1, and there is
at least one efficient ‘uninformed’ buy market order that matches the ask order when the
ask order stays at the best ask, i.e., N a(MI[t+ t′1, t+ t′1 + t′2]) ≥ 1. Therefore, the indicate
function for this ask order (whether it is filled or not) is given by
1askt,t′1,t′2,x
:= 1∆pM
t+t′1,t+t′1+t′2
≥x−∆p[t,t+t′1] + 1∆pMt+t′1,t+t′1+t′2=x−∆p[t,t+t
′
1]−1 · 1Na(MI[t+t′1,t+t′1+t′2])≥1,
where 1condition equals to 1 if this condition is true, and equals to 0 if this condition is
false.
With the above general definition, we can now give the expressions of indicators func-
tions for order fills in the main body of the paper. We first write down the formula for
1aski . Recall that 1aski , i = 0, 1, ...N specifies whether the ask outstanding order for the
i-th period is filled in the time interval [ti, ti.5). Note that an ask outstanding order acts the
same as an ask quote sent at the same price without latency. Thus, for the ask outstanding
order at time ti, i = 0, 1, ..., N , we have 1aski = 1askti,0,∆τ,ai .
Next, we given the expression of 1aski.5 , i = 0, 1, ..., N−1, which specifies whether there
exists an ask order of the maker filled in the time interval [ti.5, ti+1). If the i-th ask action
δai ∈ Z, then the 1aski.5 specifies whether the ask quote sent by the maker at time ti are filled
in [ti.5, ti+1); otherwise if δ
a
i = o, then we have 1aski.5 = 1 if and only if the ask outstanding
order for the i-th period filled in [ti.5, ti+1). Thus, we have for i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1,
1aski.5 =
{
1askti,∆τ,∆t−∆τ,δai
, δai ∈ Z,
1askti,0,∆t,ai
− 1askti,0,∆τ,ai , δ
a
i = o.
Finally, we express the indicator function 1askt′1,t′2,x
used in the definition of the order
value, see Equation (3.1). It is clear that 1askt′1,t′2,x
= 1ask0,t′1,t′2,x
. For the bid side, the
formulas of the indicator functions are similar and hence omitted.
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B Proofs of main results in Section 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. [Proof of Part (a)]. We only prove (4.1), i.e., the ask side. The bid side is similar.
For any δa ≤ 0, the ask order sent is immediately executed so 1ask0,t′2,δa ≡ 1. It then
follows from (3.1) that for any δa ≤ 0, we have Hask(0, t′2, δa) = E[0−0.5−∆p[0, t′2]] = −0.5
by the martingale property of p(·).
For δa ≥ 1, from (3.1) we deduce that in order to establish (4.1), it suffices to show
E[δa −∆p[0, t′2] | 1ask0,t′2,δa = 1] =
λa
λa + λ/2
. (B1)
To this end, we construct an appropriate Markov chain.
Denote the jump times of the two independent Poisson processes N (·) and N a(·) by
τ1, τ2, ... and τ
a
1 , τ
a
2 , ... respectively. Define
UA(t) :=
{
1, if {n ∈ N : τN (t) < τan ≤ t} 6= ∅,
0, otherwise,
UAsk(t) := (p(t), UA(t)).
Here, UA(t) specifies if there is any ‘uninformed’ buy market orders (N a(·)) arrives at
the best ask since the most recent jump of market price τN (t) at time t. One can readily
verify that UAsk(t) is a continuous-time Markov chain with state space Z×{0, 1} and the
following transition rates for any p ∈ Z:
(p, 0) −→

(p+ 1, 0), with rate λ/2,
(p− 1, 0), with rate λ/2,
(p, 1), with rate λa,
(p, 1) −→
{
(p+ 1, 0), with rate λ/2,
(p− 1, 0), with rate λ/2,
Also define:
τfill1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : UAsk(t) = (p(0) + δa − 1, 1)},
τfill2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : UAsk(t) = (p(0) + δa, 0)},
τfill := min{τfill1 , τfill2 , t′2}.
If τfill1 < min{τfill2 , t′2}, then the ask order sent at time 0 with relative price δa and
without latency will be filled by an ‘uninformed’ order before time t′2; on the other hand,
if τfill2 < min{τfill1 , t′2}, then the mid-price will cross the price of ask order before time t′2.
The ask order will be filled before time t′2 if and only if τfill < t′2. Then, we can decompose
δa −∆p[0, t′2] in Equation (B1) as follows:
E[δa −∆p[0, t′2] | 1ask0,t′2,δa = 1]
=E[p(0) + δa − p(τfill) | τfill < t′2]− E[p(t′2)− p(τfill) | τfill < t′2],
(B2)
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where the second term is zero by applying optional sampling theorem to the martingale
p(·). In addition, we note that if τfill = τfill1 , then p(τfill) = p(0) + δa − 1; if τfill = τfill2 ,
then p(τfill) = p(0) + δ
a. Therefore, we infer that
E[p(0) + δa − p(τfill) | τfill < t′2] = P(τfill = τfill1 | τfill < t′2). (B3)
So to prove (B1), it remains to show
P(τfill = τfill1 | τfill < t′2) =
λa
λa +
λ
2
. (B4)
We use the properties of the Markov chain UAsk(t) to prove (B4). Denote the jump
times of UAsk(t) by τUAskn , n ≥ 1, then
UAskn :=
{
(p(0), 0), n = 0,
UAsk(τUAskn ), n ≥ 1,
is the embedded discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) of UAsk(t) with the following tran-
sition probability:
(p, 0) −→

(p+ 1, 0), with probability
λ/2
λa + λ
,
(p− 1, 0), with probability λ/2
λa + λ
,
(p, 1), with probability
λa
λa + λ
,
(p, 1) −→
{
(p+ 1, 0), with probability 1/2,
(p− 1, 0), with probability 1/2.
Using the embedded DTMC, we can decompose the two events in the conditional proba-
bility in Equation (B3) as follows. We have {τfill = τfill1} =
⋃∞
n=1An, where
An :={UAskn = (p(0) + δa − 1, 1), UAski /∈ {(p(0) + δa − 1, 1), (p(0) + δa, 0)},
i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1,
n∑
i
τUAski < t
′
2}.
Here, An stands for the event that after n transitions, the state of the DTMC first hits
(p(0) + δa− 1, 1) while it never hits the (p(0) + δa, 0) before, and moreover the time for the
n transitions of the CTMC UAsk(t) is less than t′2 (recall that we assume all the Poisson
processes do not jump at time t′2). Similarly, we have {τfill < t′2} =
⋃∞
n=1Bn, where
Bn :={UAskn ∈ {(p(0) + δa − 1, 1), (p(0) + δa, 0)}
UAski /∈ {(p(0) + δa − 1, 1), (p(0) + δa, 0)}, i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1,
n∑
i
τUAski < t
′
2},
32
stands for the event that after n transitions, the state of the DTMC first hits {(p(0) + δa−
1, 1), (p(0) + δa, 0)} and the time for the n transitions of the CTMC UAsk(t) is less than
t′2. Note that An ⊆ Bn, n ≥ 1, and the two series of sets are both pairwise disjoint, i.e., for
any n 6= m, An ∩Am = ∅ and Bn ∩Bm = ∅.
For notational simplicity, we assume p(0) = 0. Then, we obtain that
P(An)
P(Bn)
=
P(An ∩Bn)
P(Bn)
= P(An | Bn)
=P(UAskn = (δa − 1, 1) | UAskn ∈ {(δa − 1, 1), (δa, 0)}, UAski /∈ {(δa − 1, 1), (δa, 0)},
i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1,
n∑
i
τUAski < t
′
2)
=P(UAskn = (δa − 1, 1)
| UAskn ∈ {(δa − 1, 1), (δa, 0)}, UAski /∈ {(δa − 1, 1), (δa, 0)}, i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1)
=P(UAskn = (δa − 1, 1) | UAskn ∈ {(δa − 1, 1), (δa, 0)}, UAskn−1 = (δa − 1, 0))
=
P(UAskn = (δa − 1, 1) | UAskn−1 = (δa − 1, 0))
P(UAskn ∈ {(δa − 1, 1), (δa, 0)} | UAskn−1 = (δa − 1, 0)) =
λa
λa + λ/2
.
The fourth equality holds because {UAski, i = 1, 2, ..., n} and {τUAski , i = 1, 2, ...} are
independent. The fifth equality holds because of the Markov property of {UAskn} and
because UAskn ∈ {(δa − 1, 1), (δa, 0)} only if UAskn−1 ∈ {(δa − 1, 0), (δa − 1, 1)}. Since
the ratio between each component pair (P(An),P(Bn)) is the same, by Equation (B3) we
obtain that, for any δa ≥ 1,
E[δa −∆p[0, t′2] | 1ask0,t′2,δa = 1] = P(τfill = τfill1 | τfill < t
′
2) =
∑
n=1
P(An)∑
n=1
P(Bn)
=
λa
λa + λ/2
.
Thus, the proof of part (a) is complete for the ask side.
[Proof of Part (b)]. We prove it for the ask quote as proving the bid quote similar.
By Equation (3.1), we have, for any t′1 ≥ 0, t′2 > 0 and δa ∈ Z,
Hask(t′1, t
′
2, δ
a) =E[(max{δa −∆p[0, t′1], 0} − 0.5−∆p[t′1, t′1 + t′2])1askt′1,t′2,δa ],
where the indicator function 1askt′1,t′2,x
specifies whether the ask order with relative price x
(which enters into the order book or executed at time t′1) is filled before time t′1 + t′2. Note
that {(p(t),N a(t)) : t ≥ 0} is a 2-dimensional process with stationary and independent
increments. Then given ∆p[0, t′1] = k for any k ∈ Z, we can readily infer that
E[(max{δa − k, 0} − 0.5−∆p[t′1, t′1 + t′2])1askt′1,t′2,δa | ∆p[0, t
′
1] = k]
=E[(max{δa − k, 0} − 0.5−∆p[0, t′2])1ask0,t′2,δa−k ]
=Hask(0, t′2, δ
a − k).
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Hence, we obtain the desired result from the tower property of the conditional expectations.
[Proof of Part (c)]. We prove it for the ask side. First, suppose λa ≤ λ/2. When
t′1 = 0, by part (a) of Theorem 1, for any 1 ≤ δa ∈ Z,
Hask(0, t′2, δ
a) =
(
λa
λa + λ/2
− 0.5
)
· E[1ask0.5 | δa0 = δa] ≤ 0,
and for any 0 ≥ δa ∈ Z, Hask(0, t′2, δa) = −0.5 ≤ 0. Thus, for any t′1, t′2 ≥ 0, by part (b) of
Theorem 1, for any δa ∈ Z,
Hask(t′1, t
′
2, δ
a) = E[Hask(0, t′2, δ
a −∆p[0, t′1])] ≤ 0.
Next, suppose λa > λ/2. When t′1 = 0, by part (a) of Theorem 1, when δa = 1,
Hask(0, t′2, 1) =
(
λa
λa + λ/2
− 0.5
)
· E[1ask0.5 | δa0 = 1] > 0.
Now consider t′1 > 0. By parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 1, for any δa ∈ Z, we have
Hask(t′1, t
′
2, δ
a) =
∞∑
k=−∞
Hask(0, t′2, δ
a − k)P(∆p[0, t′1] = k)
=− 0.5P(∆p[0, t′1] ≥ δa) +
(
λa
λa + λ/2
− 0.5
) δa−1∑
k=−∞
E[1ask0,t′2,δa−k
]P(∆p[0, t′1] = k)
≥− 0.5P(∆p[0, t′1] ≥ δa) +
(
λa
λa + λ/2
− 0.5
)
· E[1ask0,t′2,1 ] · P(∆p[0, t
′
1] = δ
a − 1).
We claim that
lim
δa→∞
P(∆p[0, t′1] ≥ δa)
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1)
= 0, (B5)
and hence Hask(t′1, t′2, δa) > 0 if δa is sufficiently large.
To prove Equation (B5), we first note that we only need to prove
lim
δa→∞
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa)
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1)
= 0. (B6)
This is because, if Equation (B6) holds, then there exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1), such that
for δa sufficiently large,
P(∆p[0,t′1]=δa)
P(∆p[0,t′1]=δa−1) < c. Thus, as δ
a →∞,
P(∆p[0, t′1] ≥ δa)
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1)
≤(1 + c+ c
2 + ...)P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa)
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1)
=
1
1−cP(∆p[0, t
′
1] = δ
a)
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1)
→ 0.
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Next, we prove Equation (B6). For any 1 ≤ δa ∈ Z, we have
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa)
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1)
=
∞∑
k=δa
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa | N (t′1) = k)P(N (t′1) = k)
∞∑
k=δa
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1 | N (t′1) = k − 1)P(N (t′1) = k − 1)
,
(B7)
noting that if k < δa, then P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa | N (t′1) = k) = 0. For any 1 ≤ δa ≤ k, it is
easily seen that
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa | N (t′1) = k) =

(
k
k+δa
2
)
1
2k
, if k and δa have the same parity,
0, if k and δa have opposite parity.
Thus, for any 1 ≤ δa ≤ k, if δa and k have the same parity, then
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa | N (t′1) = k)P(N (t′1) = k)
P(∆p[0, t′1] = δa − 1 | N (t′1) = k − 1)P(N (t′1) = k − 1)
=
( k
k+δa
2
)
1
2k
e−λt′1(λt′1)k/k!( k−1
k−1+δa−1
2
)
1
2k−1 e
−λt′1(λt′1)k−1/(k − 1)!
=
λt′1
k + δa
≤ λt
′
1
2δa
.
Therefore, by Equation (B7), we obtain that
P(∆p[0,t′1]=δa)
P(∆p[0,t′1]=δa−1) ≤
λt′1
2δa → 0, as δa →∞. Thus,
Equation (B6) holds and the proof of part (c) is complete for the ask side. The proof for
the bid part is similar and hence omitted.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove Theorem 2 by backward induction and using the Bellman Equation (2.7).
Recall the definitions of 1aski ,1aski.5 ,1bidi ,1bidi.5 ,∆pi,∆pi.5, paski.5 , pbidi.5 given in Section A.3.
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For i = N , by the Bellman equation (2.7), for any s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S, we have
vN (s) =E[wN.5 + (pN.5 + 0.5)qN.5 − 0.5|qN.5|
∣∣sN = s]
=E[w + (p+ a)1askN − (p+ b)1bidN + (p+ ∆pN + 0.5)(q − 1askN + 1bidN )
− 0.5|q − 1askN + 1bidN |
∣∣sN = s]
=w + (p+ 0.5)q + E[(a− 0.5−∆pN )1askN | aN = a]
+ E[(∆pN + 0.5− b)1bidN | bN = b]− 0.5E[ |q − 1askN + 1bidN |
∣∣(aN , bN ) = (a, b)]
=w + (p+ 0.5)q + E[(a− 0.5−∆p0)1ask0 | a0 = a] + E[(∆p0 + 0.5− b)1bid0 | b0 = b]
− 0.5E[ |q − 1ask0 + 1bid0 |
∣∣(a0, b0) = (a, b)]
=w + (p+ 0.5)q +Hask(0,∆τ, a) +Hbid(0,∆τ, b)− 0.5E[ |q − 1ask0 + 1bid0 |
∣∣(a0, b0) = (a, b)],
=w + (p+ 0.5)q + gN (q, a, b)
where the second equality follows from Equations (A11)-(A13), the fourth one is due to the
stationarity of the MDP, and the fifth one follows from the definitions of functions Hask
and Hbid.
For i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, assume vi+1(s) = w + (p + 0.5)q + gi+1(q, a, b) for any s =
(w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S, then by the Bellman equation (2.7), for any s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S,
vi(s) = max
(δa,δb)∈As
E[vi+1(si+1) | si = s, (δai , δbi ) = (δa, δb)]
= max
(δa,δb)∈As
E[vi+1(s1) | s0 = s, (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
= max
(δa,δb)∈As
E[w1 + (p1 + 0.5)q1 + gi+1(q1, a1, b1) | s0 = s, (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
= max
(δa,δb)∈As
E[w + (p+ a)1ask0 − (p+ b)1bid0 + pask0.51ask0.5 − pbid0.51bid0.5
+ (p+ ∆p0 + ∆p0.5 + 0.5)(q − 1ask0 + 1bid0 − 1ask0.5 + 1bid0.5)
+ gi+1(q1, a1, b1) | s0 = s, (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)],
where the second equality comes from the stationarity of the MDP, the third one comes from
the assumption for vi+1 and the fourth one comes from Equations (A6)-(A8). Reorganizing
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the terms, we obtain
vi(s) = max
(δa,δb)∈As
{
w + (p+ 0.5)q +Hask(0,∆τ, a)− E[∆p0.51ask0 | a0 = a] +Hbid(0,∆τ, b)
+ E[∆p0.51bid0 | b0 = b] + E[(pask0.5 − p−∆p0 −∆p0.5 − 0.5)1ask0.5 ]
+ E[(p+ ∆p0 + ∆p0.5 + 0.5− pbid0.5)1bid0.5 ]
+ E[gi+1(q1, a1, b1) | (q0, a0, b0) = (q, a, b), (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
}
=w + (p+ 0.5)q +Hask(0,∆τ, a) +Hbid(0,∆τ, b)− E[∆p0.5]E[1ask0 | a0 = a]
+ E[∆p0.5]E[1bid0 | b0 = b] + max
(δa,δb)∈As
{
E[(pask0.5 − p−∆p0 −∆p0.5 − 0.5)1ask0.5 ]
+ E[(p+ ∆p0 + ∆p0.5 + 0.5− pbid0.5)1bid0.5 ]
+ E[gi+1(q1, a1, b1) | (q0, a0, b0) = (q, a, b), (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
}
=w + (p+ 0.5)q +Hask(0,∆τ, a) +Hbid(0,∆τ, b)
+ max
(δa,δb)∈As
{
E[(pask0.5 − p−∆p0 −∆p0.5 − 0.5)1ask0.5 ]
+ E[(p+ ∆p0 + ∆p0.5 + 0.5− pbid0.5)1bid0.5 ]
+ E[gi+1(q1, a1, b1) | (q0, a0, b0) = (q, a, b), (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
}
where the first equality follows from the definitions of functions Hask, Hbid, the second
equality holds because given that (a0, b0) = (a, b), ∆p0.5 is independent with 1ask0 and
1bid0 , noting that 1ask0 and 1bid0 depend on {(
N (t)∑
i=1
Xi,N a(t),N b(t)) : t ∈ [0, t0.5)} while
∆p0.5 =
N (t1)∑
i=N (t0.5)+1
Xi. The third equality holds because p(·) is a martingale.
By the definition of the functionGi, it remains to prove that, for any possible (a, b, δ
b, δb),
Hask(0,∆τ, a) + E[(pask0.5 − p−∆p0 −∆p0.5 − 0.5)1ask0.5 | (a0, δa0) = (a, δa)] = Haskact (a, δa),
Hbid(0,∆τ, b) + E[(p+ ∆p0 + ∆p0.5 + 0.5− pbid0.5)1bid0.5 | (b0, δb0) = (b, δb)] = Hbidact(b, δb).
(B8)
We prove the ask part of (B8). For δa ∈ Z, we can obtain the ask part of Equation (B8) by
directly using the definitions of pask0.5 (given after equation (A10)) and H
ask
act (a, δ
a). For
δa = o, we need to show
Hask(0,∆τ, a) +E[(a−∆p0−∆p0.5− 0.5)1ask0.5 | (a0, δa0) = (a, o)] = Hask(0,∆t, a) (B9)
This can also be readily verified by using the definition of Hask in (3.1) and the fact that
the price process p(·) is a martingale. The proof is thus complete.
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, we first need to prove a lemma showing that when other parameters
fixed, the net profit of the market maker NP is a non-decreasing function of the number
of quoting periods N .
Lemma 4. Fix latency ∆τ ≥ 0 and other parameters λ, λa, λb,∆t, q, q. We have NP is a
non-decreasing function of N .
Proof of Lemma 4. The main idea is given as follows. Comparing two MDP problems with
N and N + 1 periods respectively, the value function at time t1 in the latter is the same as
the value function at t0 (i.e., the initial one) in the former, because they can be computed
by the same backward recursion (Bellman equation) from the same terminal value function.
For s = (w, p, 0,∞,−∞), the value function at t0 in the N + 1 period problem is greater
than or equal to that at t1 in the same problem, because the maker can choose to post no
orders in the initial action. Thus, NP with N + 1 periods is greater than or equal to that
with N periods.
Mathematically, by Theorem 2 and equation (4.8), NP = g0(0,∞,−∞) is a function
of N . Denote this function by fNP (N). Clearly we have fNP (0) = 0. For the two MDP
problems with N = n ≥ 1 and N = n+ 1, denote the value functions and corresponding g
function by vni (s), g
n
i (s), i = 0, 1, ..., n and v
n+1
i (s), g
n+1
i (s), i = 0, 1, ..., n + 1 respectively.
By Theorem 2, functions vn0 (s) and v
n+1
1 (s) are computed by the same backward recursion
process starting from the same function
vnn(s) = v
n+1
n+1(s) =w + (p+ 0.5)q +H
ask(0,∆τ, a) +Hbid(0,∆τ, b)
− 0.5E[ |q − 1ask0 + 1bid0 |
∣∣(a0, b0) = (a, b)],
for any s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S. Therefore, for any s ∈ S, vn0 (s) = vn+11 (s). By Theorem 2,
we have for any w, p ∈ Z
vn+10 (w, p, 0,∞,−∞)
=w + p · 0 + max
(δa,δb)∈As
{
Haskact (∞, δa) +Hbidact(−∞, δb) + E[gn+11 (q1, a1, b1)
| (q0, a0, b0) = (0,∞,−∞), (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
}
≥w +Haskact (∞,∞) +Hbidact(−∞,−∞)
+ E[gn+11 (q1, a1, b1) | (q0, a0, b0) = (0,∞,−∞), (δa0 , δb0) = (∞,−∞)]
=w + gn+11 (0,∞,−∞) = vn+11 (w, p, 0,∞,−∞).
Thus, we obtain that
fNP (n+ 1) = v
n+1
0 (w, p, 0,∞,−∞)− w
≥ vn+11 (w, p, 0,∞,−∞)− w = vn0 (w, p, 0,∞,−∞)− w = fNP (n).
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The proof is therefore complete.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first prove part (1). By part (c) of Theorem 1, if λa ≤ λ/2
and λb ≤ λ/2, functions Hask, Hbid are always non-positive and hence by the definitions
of Haskact , H
bid
act , for any possible (a, b, δ
a, δb), Haskact (a, δ
a), Hbidact(b, δ
b) are both non-positive.
We prove gi(q, a, b) ≤ 0, for i = 0, 1, ..., N and any admissible (q, a, b) by the backward
recursion in Theorem 2. For i = N , it holds directly from Equation (4.6). Suppose for
some i (1 ≤ i ≤ N), gi(q, a, b) ≤ 0 for any admissible (q, a, b). Then from equations (4.6)
and (4.7), we obtain that for any admissible (q, a, b),
gi−1(q, a, b) = max
(δa,δb)∈As
{
Haskact (a, δ
a) +Hbidact(b, δ
b) + E[gi(q1, a1, b1)
| (q0, a0, b0) = (q, a, b), (δa0 , δb0) = (δa, δb)]
}
≤ 0.
Therefore, gi(q, a, b) ≤ 0, for i = 0, 1, ..., N and any admissible (q, a, b). It follows from
Equation (4.8), that
NP = g0(0,∞,−∞) ≤ 0.
Hence, NP = 0.
Next, we prove part (2). Suppose λa > λ/2 and λb > λ/2. By part (c) of Theorem 1,
there exists a quote pair, denoted by (δa,M , δb,M ) ∈ Z2, such that Hask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) > 0
and Hbid(∆τ,∆t, δb,M ) > 0. Obviously, we have δaM , δ
b
M ∈ Z and if ∆τ = 0 then δaM ≥
1, δbM ≤ 0, otherwise their order values will be 0 or −0.5. The main idea is that we construct
an admissible policy using this quote pair (δa,M , δb,M ), following which the expected profit
is positive if N is a sufficiently large even number. Then, Nmin exists since NP is a non-
increasing function of N by Lemma 4. We also give an upper bound of Nmin that is an N
which is sufficient to make the profit positive following the admissible policy.
First, we define the admissible policy. Denote by vpii (s) the expected TW following
any admissible policy pi = {fi : i = 0, 1, ...N} starting from time ti with initial state
s = (w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S. We consider an admissible policy p˜i = {f˜i : i = 0, 1, ...N} in any
of our MDP problem with an even N ≥ 4, i.e., N = 2K for some 2 ≤ K ∈ N. Starting
from time 0 with an initial state (w, p, 0,∞,−∞) for any w, p ∈ Z, p˜i is defined as follows.
For i = 1, 3, 5, ..., N − 1, i.e., i is odd, for any w, p ∈ Z, a, b ∈ Z, q ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that
(w, p, q, a, b) ∈ S, define
f˜i(w, p, q, a, b) := (∞,−∞).
For i = 2, 4, 6, ..., N − 2, i.e., i is even except 0 and N , for any w, p ∈ Z, q ∈ {−1, 0, 1},
define
f˜i(w, p, q,∞,−∞) :=

(δa,M ,−∞), q = 1,
(∞,−∞), q = 0,
(∞, δb,M ), q = −1.
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For any w, p ∈ Z, define f˜0(w, p, 0,∞,∞) := (δa,M , δb,M ). For a state s, if (δa, δb) = f˜i(s),
we also write δa = f˜ai (s), δ
b = f˜ bi (s), i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1. Under this policy, at time
ti, i = 2, 4, 6, ...., N − 2, the maker will post no orders if his inventory is 0, sell one unit at
the relative price δa,M if his inventory is 1, and buy one unit at δb,M if his inventory is -1.
At time ti, i = 1, 3, 5, ...., N − 1, the maker cancels old orders if any and does not post any
new orders. At time tN , the maker unwinds his inventory if any. At time t0 = 0, there are
no inventory nor outstanding orders and the maker quotes at (δa,M , δb,M ). Therefore, at
time ti, i = 0, 2, 4, 6, ..., N − 2, there are no outstanding orders. Moreover, the inventory of
the maker always belongs to {−1, 0, 1}. Hence, the above definition is enough for p˜i.
Then, we give the backward recursion for this policy. Standard arguments in MDP
theory yield that for i = 0, 2, 4, ..., N − 2, for any w, p ∈ Z, q ∈ {−1, 0, 1},
vp˜ii (w, p, q,∞,−∞) =E[vp˜ii+2(wi+2, pi+2, qi+2,∞,−∞) | (wi, pi, qi, ai, bi) = (w, p, q,∞,−∞),
(δai , δ
b
i ) = f˜i(w, p, q,∞,−∞), (δai+1, δbi+1) = (∞,−∞)].
Then, using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain that, for i =
2, 4, 6, ..., N , for any w, p ∈ Z, q ∈ {−1, 0, 1},
vp˜ii (w, p, q,∞,−∞) =w + (p+ 0.5)q + gp˜ii (q),
where gp˜iN (q) = −0.5|q|, and
gp˜ii (q) =H
ask(∆τ,∆t, f˜ai (w, p, q,∞,−∞)) +Hbid(∆τ,∆t, f˜ bi (w, p, q,∞,−∞))
+ E[gp˜ii+2(q2) | (q0, a0, b0) = (q,∞,−∞),
(δa0 , δ
b
0) = f˜i(w, p, q,∞,−∞), (δa1 , δb1) = (∞,−∞)], for i = 2, 4, 6, ..., N − 2.
(B10)
To understand Equation B10, note that for each order sent at time ti, i = 2, 4, 6, ...N − 2,
the lifetime is ∆t due to the cancellation instruction in the next period and there are no
outstanding orders at time ti, i = 2, 4, 6, ...N − 2. Similarly, for any w, p ∈ Z, we have
vp˜i0 (w, p, 0,∞,−∞) = w + (p+ 0.5) · 0 + gp˜i0 (0) = w + gp˜i0 (0), where
gp˜i0 (0) =H
ask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) +Hbid(∆τ,∆t, δb,M ) + E[gp˜i2 (q2) | (q0, a0, b0) = (0,∞,−∞),
(δa0 , δ
b
0) = (δ
a,M , δb,M ), (δa1 , δ
b
1) = (∞,−∞)].
(B11)
Next, we prove that if N is sufficiently large, then gp˜i0 (0) > 0. To show this, by Equation
(B11), we only need to prove gp˜i2 (q) ≥ 0 for q = −1, 0, 1, since Hask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) +
Hbid(∆τ,∆t, δb,M ) > 0. First, we prove gp˜i2 (0) = 0. By Equation (B10), we obtain that, for
i = 2, 4, 6, ..., N − 2,
gp˜ii (0) =H
ask(∆τ,∆t,∞) +Hbid(∆τ,∆t,−∞)
+E[gp˜ii+2(q2) | (q0, a0, b0) = (0,∞,−∞), (δa0 , δb0) = (∞,−∞), (δa1 , δb1) = (∞,−∞)]
=gp˜ii+2(0).
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Hence, for i = 2, 4, 6, ..., N − 2, gp˜ii (0) = gp˜iN (0) = 0. Then, we prove that if N is sufficiently
large, then gp˜i2 (±1) > 0. Recall that 1ask∆τ,∆t,δa,M specifies whether the ask order sent at
time 0 and the relative price δa,M with latency ∆τ is filled in the time interval [∆τ,∆τ+∆t).
It can be readily verified that given δa0 = δ
a,M we have 1ask
∆τ,∆t,δa,M
= 1ask0.5 + 1ask1 .
Intuitively, the ask order is filled if and only if either it is filled in the time interval [∆τ,∆t),
which is represented by 1ask0.5 = 1, or it stays as an outstanding order at time t1 = ∆t, and
then filled in the time interval [∆t,∆τ + ∆t), which is represented by 1ask1 = 1. Denote
the fill probability of this ask order quoted at relative price δa,M by pa, where
pa = P(1ask
∆τ,∆t,δa,M
= 1). (B12)
By Equation (B10), for i = 2, 4, 6, ..., N − 2, we have
gp˜ii (1) =H
ask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) + E[gp˜ii+2(1− 1ask0.5 − 1ask1) | (q0, a0, b0) = (1,∞,−∞),
(δa0 , δ
b
0) = (δ
a,M ,−∞), (δa1 , δb1) = (∞,−∞)]
=Hask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) + E[gp˜ii+2(1− 1ask∆τ,∆t,δa,M ) | (q0, a0, b0) = (1,∞,−∞),
(δa0 , δ
b
0) = (δ
a,M ,−∞), (δa1 , δb1) = (∞,−∞)]
=Hask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) + E[gp˜ii+2(1− 1ask∆τ,∆t,δa,M )]
=Hask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) + pagp˜ii+2(0) + (1− pa)gp˜ii+2(1)
=Hask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) + (1− pa)gp˜ii+2(1),
where we have used the fact that the random variable 1ask
∆τ,∆t,δa,M
does not depend on
q0, a0, b0, δ
a
0 , δ
b
0, δ
a
1 or δ
b
1. It is similar for the bid side. Define the fill probability of the bid
order quoted at δb,M by pb, where
pb = P(1bid
∆τ,∆t,δb,M
= 1). (B13)
For i = 2, 4, 6, ..., N − 2, we have
gp˜ii (−1) =Hbid(∆τ,∆t, δb,M ) + (1− pb)gp˜ii+2(−1).
Recall N = 2K. Solving the above recursive equations for gp˜ii (±1) with gp˜iN (1) = gp˜iN (−1) =
−0.5, we obtain that
gp˜i2 (1) =
(
−0.5− H
ask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M )
pa
)
(1− pa)K−1 + H
ask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M )
pa
,(B14)
gp˜i2 (−1) =
(
−0.5− H
bid(∆τ,∆t, δb,M )
pb
)
(1− pb)K−1 + H
bid(∆τ,∆t, δb,M )
pb
. (B15)
Note that 0 < pa, pb < 1 because (δa,M , δb,M ) ∈ Z2. In addition, Hask(∆τ,∆t, δa,M ) > 0
and Hbid(∆τ,∆t, δb,M ) > 0. Thus, if N is sufficiently large, then gp˜i2 (±1) > 0 and hence
gp˜i0 (0) > 0.
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Finally, since p˜i is an admissible policy, by Equation (4.8), we obtain that
NP ≥ vp˜i0 (w, p, 0,∞,−∞)− w = gp˜i0 (0) > 0.
Note that the backward recursion for value functions in each period depends on the model
parameters λ, λa, λb,∆τ,∆t, q and q. It follows from the monotonicity of fNP (N) (Lemma
4) and the fact fNP (N) > 0 when N is even and sufficiently large that there exists a
constant integer Nmin ≥ 1 depending on λ, λa, λb,∆τ,∆t, q and q, such that fNP (N) > 0
if and only if N ≥ Nmin. For an upper bound of Nmin, define
Nmin := 2 max


ln H
ask(∆τ,∆t,δa,M )
Hask(∆τ,∆t,δa,M )+0.5pa
ln (1− pa)
 ,

ln H
bid(∆τ,∆t,,δb,M )
Hbid(∆τ,∆t,δb,M )+0.5pb
ln (1− pb)

+ 2,
where pa, pb are the fill probabilities of ask and bid orders given in (B12) and (B13). It
can be readily verified that when N ≥ Nmin, gp˜i2 (±1) > 0 and hence gp˜i0 (0) > 0. Therefore,
Nmin ≥ Nmin. Now the proof for part (2) is complete.
C Estimations of λa and λb for a hypothetical market maker
In this section, we discuss how to estimate λa and λb for a particular market maker. In our
model, there are two cases for an order’s execution. The first is that the order is filled and
the mid-price does not move at the execution time, called by Type I event. The second
is that the order is filled due to a price move, called by Type II event. Using similar
arguments as in the proof of Part (a) of Theorem 1, one can show that for the best bid
order (δb = 0) sent at time 0 with latency ∆τ ≥ 0, we have
P[p(texe) = p(0) | p(∆τ) = p(0), texe < tfirstmove] = λ
b
λb + 0.5λ
, (B1)
where texe is the execution time of the bid order and
tfirstmove := inf{t ≥ 0 | p(t) = p(0) + 1}
is the first time that the market price moves up by 1 tick. In (B1), the left hand side is the
probability of a Type I event for the bid order conditioned on that the bid order enters into
the best bid level correctly and the bid order is filled before market price moves up. Based
on (B1) and actual order submissions and executions, a market maker can first estimate
the conditional probability and then use the estimated value of λ to compute the estimated
value of λb.
We illustrate this estimation procedure using artificial order simulations based on NAS-
DAQ’s TotalView-ITCH message data. The simulation procedure is similar as in Moallemi
and Yuan (2017). Without loss of generality we focus on bid orders for an illustration.
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We randomly insert 500 artificial orders (subject to latency) at best bid price level in the
order book each day, and update the status of the orders at every event time under the
matching rule of the exchange. The artificial orders are assumed to be of infinitesimal size,
so they do not impact the market. Given a fixed latency level, only those orders for which
the market price does not move in the latency window are considered. For any of such
bid bids, suppose the order is filled before the market best bid price moves up. If at the
execution time the market price does not move down, then the order’s execution is counted
as a Type I event; otherwise it is counted as a Type II event. Denote the total number of
Type I events by n1 and that of Type II events by n2. By (B1), we have
n1
n1+n2
≈ λb
λb+0.5λ
and thus the maker estimates λb by n1λ2n2 . The rate λ
a can be estimated similarly.
We now report the estimation results based on the data of GE in the forth quarter of
2016. As for a given λ, the estimated values of λa and λb essentially depend on the ratio
between the number of Type I events and that of Type II events, we focus on reporting the
ratio λb/(0.5λ). As the results vary among different days, we show the average ratios for
the quarter for different latency levels. See Table 2. We can observe that the ratio decreases
from 1.07 > 1, i.e., λb > 0.5λ to 0.94 < 1, i.e., λb < 0.5λ as latency increases. The reason
is that given the market environment, a hypothetical market maker with lower latency
can obtain better queue positions for his orders and suffer less from adverse selections on
average.
Table 2: λb/(0.5λ) for different latency for GE in 2016Q4.
∆τ(ms) 0 10 50 100 500 1000 2000
ratio λb/(0.5λ) 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.00 0.97 0.94
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